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Preface
The primary purpose of the study is to analyse the operation 
of the right to silence which is available to accused persons 
during pre-trial and trial stage, and to determine whether the 
exercise of such right entitled the courts to comment and draw 
adverse coipon sense inferences as consent or implied admission 
to the accusation,, consciousness of guilt or strengthens the 
inferences from the opposing- case.
The scope of the stud;/ includes the situations in Malaysia, 
England and particularly in Singapore in which this right has been 
diminished by a recent amendments to their Criminal Procedure Code 
in the hope that accused persons testify more often.
Finally, the paper will also deal with the recommendations 
made by the Criminal Law Revision Committee (U.K.) to abolish 
such right during pre-trial and the criticisms followed thereafter.
I wish to thank. Mr. Valentine Manuel for being my supervisor 
and my sincere thanks also goes to my sister and my colleagues for 
their moral support, advice and kind assistance in dealing with the 
subject-matter of this paper.
The errors and omissions in expressing’ my view are mine. The 
law is discussed as it stands as from the date of the paper.
May, 1986
Mary St. Hj. Hamim 
Diploma in Law 
MARA Institute of Technology 
Shah Alam.
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List of Statutes
1. Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6 with annotations of 
amendments 1970 - 1976 as at I5th. March 1983)
2. Criminal Procedure (Amendment & Extension) Act, I976 - (Malaysia)
5. Minor Offences Ordinance, 1955*
4. Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976 - (Singapore)
RIGHT TO SILENCE
I. Definition
The so-called right to silence ia a two-fold : in relation 
to the pre-trial stage (out-of-court) silence, where it means that 
tne accused is entitled to abstain from making any statement or 
comment when interrogated by the police or other investigating 
authority.
In relation to the trial stage (in-court) silence, the right
to silence means that the prosecution’have the onus of establishing
his guilt, that he can decline to give evidence and that the
prosecution may not comment on his so doing. An accused person who
raises a plea of alibi for the first time does, however run serious
risk. In such cases, the judge may, in the summing up (if it a jury
trial) invite the jury to taJke into consideration the ommission of
the accused to disclose his defence at the preliminary enquiry in
the Magistrate's court. It would however be a misdirection for the
judge to infer or to invite the jury as the case may be to infer
guilt by reason of such omission on the part of the accused.'*'
In this respect, the law in Malaysia follows the English law as
2enunciated in various cases decided there.
-I-
1 Fazal Din v P.P. (19 4 9) M.L.J. 123
2 Naylor 23 Cr. App RII7, Littleboy 24 Cr. App.R.I92; Leckey 
(1943) 2 All E.R. 6 6 5, Hoare 50 Cr. App R.I66 and Sullivan 51 
Cr. App R.I02
The same principle would apply to cases under the Px’evention 
of Corruption Act, the Internal Security Act and the Kidnapping Act 
when cautioned statement made by the accused are tendered in evidence.
2. The Right As Derived From The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
The right to silence is derived from the privilege against 
self-incrimination, which is "based on our unwillingness to subject 
those suspected of crime to the cruel dilemma of self-accusation 
4the perjury or contemplation."
The privilege against self-incrimination operates in favour of every 
witness and it states that a suspect has a right to silence when 
questioned about an offence, nemo tenetur prodere seipsum - no one 
is obliged to gxve himself away. The rule was stated by Lord Goddard 
L.J. in the following terms'* :-
"...no one is bound to answer ai\y question if the 
answer thereto would, in the opinion of the judge 
have the tendency to expose the deponent to any 
criminal charge, penalty or (in a criminal case) 
forfeiture whish the judge regard as reasonably 
likely to be preffered or sued for".
It is also based on the idea that a suspect or accused should 
not be constrained to choose between either lying or incriminating 
himself.
3 Rattan Singh v P.P. (I97l) I M.L.J. at p.166
4 per Golberg J. in Murphy v Water Front Commissioners,378 U.S.
52 at p.55
5 Blunt v Park Hotel ltd. (1942) 2 K.B. 253
